This paper applies conjectural variations (CVs) to a model of public good provision and shows that CVs are superior to Nash beliefs. In addition to imposing consistency, as Bresnahan, I show that consistent conjectures (CCs) are obtained from individual payoff maximization. CCs emerge as the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (NE) in a two-stage game in which beliefs are chosen in Stage 1 and quantities in Stage 2. There is an individual payoff advantage to non-Nash behavior, generating a Prisoner's Dilemma in conjectures in addition to the usual free-rider problem associated with public goods. The correct and payoff maximizing conjecture is the unique equilibrium in an evolutionary framework against a player with Nash conjectures. The consistent conjecture equilibrium is the unique evolutionary equilibrium when both players conjectures evolve. Hence, the NE prediction is too optimistic when players have rational conjectures.

中文翻译：

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公共物品博弈中的理性猜想与演化信念

本文将推测变异 (CV) 应用于公共物品提供模型，并表明 CV 优于纳什信念。除了强加一致性之外，作为 Bresnahan，我表明一致性猜想 (CC) 是从个人收益最大化中获得的。CC 在两阶段博弈中作为独特的子博弈完美纳什均衡 (NE) 出现，其中在阶段 1 中选择信念，在阶段 2 中选择数量。 非纳什行为具有个人收益优势，在猜想中产生囚徒困境除了常见的与公共物品相关的搭便车问题。正确且收益最大化的猜想是进化框架中针对具有纳什猜想的玩家的独特均衡。一致猜想均衡是双方猜想都演化的唯一演化均衡。因此，当玩家有理性猜想时，NE 预测过于乐观。