Economies with lack of commitment have been extensively studied using instruments like collateral and market exclusion. In collateral models agents cannot transfer wealth from the future and an efficient allocation may not be implementable even if markets are complete. We study an economy with secured and unsecured assets, the last ones are important in allowing transfers from the future. Bankruptcy punishment is the seizure of a fraction of agent’s income, this results in a non-convex budget set. We provide some conditions to implement the Arrow Debreu allocation (AD) with a large enough seizure rate, indirectly proving equilibrium existence. Further, we perform a numerical exercise with US data to prove that if agents in the lower income quartile have a positive probability of coming up to a larger one (more social mobility) then we can implement AD and the minimum seizure rate depends inversely on this probability.

缺乏承诺的经济体已使用抵押品和市场排斥等工具进行了广泛研究。在抵押模型中，代理商无法从未来转移财富，即使市场完整，也无法实施有效的分配。我们研究的是有抵押和无抵押资产的经济，最后一种对于允许未来转移非常重要。破产处罚是没收代理人收入的一小部分，这导致预算集不凸。我们提供了一些条件，可以以足够大的癫痫发作率实施箭形碎片分配（AD），间接证明均衡存在。进一步，