Abstract The information gap in the M&A market hinders acquirers from effectively identifying high-quality targets. We examine whether VC/PEs convey information content in the M&A market and whether acquirers can use such information to identify high-quality targets. We show that VC/PEs have significant information content and can signal high-quality target companies via “certification”. When acquirers lack acquisition experience and targets are located in inferior information environments, VC/PE “certification” is more significant. The better reputation a VC/PE has, the more information it conveys. Syndicate VC/PEs convey stronger information than independent VC/PEs. We also find that acquirers do not pay higher premiums for high-quality targets. Overall, our results suggest that VC/PEs have value relevance in the M&A market, confirming their “certification” role. We present means for acquirers to select high-quality targets and investors to build efficient portfolios.

中文翻译：

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确定并购目标和VC / PE的信息内容

摘要并购市场中的信息鸿沟阻碍了收购方有效地确定高质量的目标。我们研究了VC / PE是否在并购市场中传达信息内容，以及收购方是否可以使用此类信息来确定高质量的目标。我们表明，VC / PE具有重要的信息内容，并且可以通过“认证”向高质量的目标公司发出信号。如果收购方缺乏收购经验，而目标却位于劣质的信息环境中，那么VC / PE“认证”就显得尤为重要。VC / PE的声誉越好，它传达的信息就越多。与独立VC / PE相比，辛迪加VC / PE传递的信息更强。我们还发现，收购方不会为高质量目标支付更高的保费。总体而言，我们的结果表明，风险投资/私募股权在并购市场中具有价值相关性，确认其“认证”角色。我们为收购者提供选择高质量目标的手段，为投资者提供建立有效投资组合的手段。