Under quadratic voting people are able to buy votes with money. The claims that rational voters will make efficient electoral choices rest on assumptions about how voters acquire and share information. Specifically, that all voters share common knowledge about the probability that any one of them will be the decisive voter, but do not (appear to) share knowledge in any specialized way within special interest groups. This paper asserts that quadratic voting is no more likely to promote efficiency than the current system of one-person-one-vote. Information costs are critical. If information is costly, organized interest groups on either side of an issue provide low-cost information to their members and sharing common knowledge across groups is less likely. Then, small differences lead to large welfare losses. If information is free, special-interest groups provide opportunities for collusion that undermines the efficiency of quadratic voting. Even if collusion could be prevented, the dual uses of money to buy votes and to disseminate information organizes interest groups as if their members were colluding. The role of information and the fact that voting is not costless create efficiency biases under quadratic voting that favor political organization and concentrated values. To the extent that these attributes are overrepresented in the present system, quadratic voting will only make it worse.

中文翻译：

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二次投票会产生最优的公共政策吗？

在二次投票下，人们可以用钱购买选票。理性选民将做出有效选举选择的主张基于关于选民如何获取和共享信息的假设。具体而言，所有选民都共享关于他们中的任何一个将成为决定性选民的概率的共同知识，但不会（似乎）在特殊利益集团内以任何专门的方式共享知识。本文断言，二次投票并不比当前的一人一票制度更有可能提高效率。信息成本至关重要。如果信息成本高昂，则问题任何一方的有组织的利益集团都会向其成员提供低成本信息，而跨群体共享共同知识的可能性较小。那么，小的差异会导致大的福利损失。如果信息是免费的，特殊利益集团提供了破坏二次投票效率的勾结机会。即使可以防止勾结，金钱购买选票和传播信息的双重用途也会组织利益集团，就好像他们的成员在勾结一样。信息的作用以及投票并非无成本的事实在二次投票下产生了有利于政治组织和集中价值的效率偏差。如果这些属性在当前系统中被过度代表，二次投票只会让情况变得更糟。信息的作用以及投票并非无成本的事实在二次投票下产生了有利于政治组织和集中价值的效率偏差。如果这些属性在当前系统中被过度代表，二次投票只会让情况变得更糟。信息的作用以及投票并非无成本的事实在二次投票下产生了有利于政治组织和集中价值的效率偏差。如果这些属性在当前系统中被过度代表，二次投票只会让情况变得更糟。