National and international criminal courts often choose to focus prosecutions on the heads of organizations that commit international crimes. In this article we consider a game between a law enforcement authority and a head of a criminal organization who decides on his level of personal exposure to crime and the number of individual criminals he recruits. Our results highlight that, depending on the level of social harm and detection costs, optimal enforcement does not always imply concentrating enforcement resources on the head of the organization and may involve investing resources in detecting and sanctioning individual criminals who execute the crime for the head.

中文翻译：

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关于国际犯罪背景下的最佳执法

国家和国际刑事法院通常选择将起诉重点放在犯下国际罪行的组织的负责人身上。在本文中，我们考虑了执法机构与犯罪组织负责人之间的博弈，后者决定了他对犯罪的个人承受程度以及所招募的个别犯罪分子的数量。我们的结果表明，根据社会伤害和侦查成本的高低，最佳执法并不总是意味着将执法资源集中在组织的头上，而可能涉及投资资源以侦查和制裁以头为犯罪的个人罪犯。