Robert Card's "Reasonability View" is a significant contribution to the debate over the place of conscientious objection in health care. In his view, conscientious objections can only be accommodated if the grounds for the objection meet a reasonability standard. I identify inconsistencies in Card's description of the reasonability standard and argue that each version he specifies is unsatisfactory. The criteria for reasonability that Card sets out most frequently have no clear underpinning principle and are too permissive of immoral objections. Card has also claimed that petitioners must justify their positions with Rawlsian public reason. I argue that, although the resulting reasonability standard is principled, it is overly restrictive. I also show that a reasonability standard built on Rawls' more lenient conception of reasonableness would be overly permissive of objections at odds with professional healthcare standards. Finally, I argue for my favored solution, which bases the reasonability standard on minimal professional standards.

中文翻译：

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医疗保健中的良心反对：确定合理性观点

Robert Card 的“合理性观点”对关于良心拒服兵役在医疗保健中的地位的争论做出了重大贡献。在他看来，只有当反对的理由符合合理标准时，才能接受良心反对。我发现 Card 对合理性标准的描述存在不一致之处，并认为他指定的每个版本都不令人满意。Card 最常提出的合理性标准没有明确的基础原则，并且过于容忍不道德的反对意见。卡还声称，请愿人必须以罗尔斯的公开理由证明他们的立场是正确的。我认为，尽管由此产生的合理性标准是有原则的，但它过于严格。我还展示了建立在罗尔斯的合理性标准 对合理性更宽松的概念会过于宽容与专业医疗保健标准不一致的反对意见。最后，我主张我喜欢的解决方案，该解决方案基于最低专业标准的合理性标准。