We study a supply chain in which a supplier with encroachment capability and quantity-based cost decline sells through a retailer with demand information advantage. By solving a signaling game, we find that cost decline increases the possibility of order distortion. The obtained results also show that without encroachment, both supply chain members are better off from cost decline; with encroachment, cost decline always hurts the retailer and benefits the supplier only if the direct selling cost is not very high. In addition, encroachment benefits the supplier when the direct selling cost or the cost decline efficiency is relatively low, while benefits the retailer when the direct selling cost is sufficiently high. Finally, we discuss on different information structures and obtain some information management insights.

我们研究了一个供应链，其中具有入侵能力和基于数量的成本下降的供应商通过具有需求信息优势的零售商进行销售。通过解决一个信号博弈，我们发现成本下降增加了订单失真的可能性。获得的结果还表明，在不侵占的情况下，两个供应链成员都能更好地避免成本下降；随着价格的下降，成本下降总是会伤害零售商并使供应商受益，前提是直销成本不是很高。另外，当直销成本或成本下降效率相对较低时，侵害使供应商受益，而当直销成本足够高时，侵害零售商则使零售商受益。最后，我们讨论了不同的信息结构并获得了一些信息管理方面的见识。