I argue that Norton’s reconstruction of an example inductive inference in Ch.1 of The Material Theory of Induction mischaracterizes scientific induction by treating the ampliation as separable (and separated) from that inherent in conceptualization per se—effectively severing the putative ampliation from its putative warrant. I sketch an alternative analysis in which ampliation and warrant remain closely coupled through a common root in the primary conceptualizations.

中文翻译：

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什么是归纳（以及不应该是什么）：以概念为中心的诺顿氯化镭示例

我认为，诺顿在《归纳材料理论》第 1 章中对示例归纳推理的重构错误地描述了科学归纳，将放大视为与概念化本身固有的放大可分离（和分离）——有效地将推定的放大与其推定的保证分开. 我勾勒出另一种分析，其中放大和保证通过主要概念化的共同根源保持紧密耦合。