ABSTRACT

Situating the Turkish counterinsurgency within the global context of Cold War counterinsurgencies this article sheds light on counterinsurgency’s provocative and affect-generating techniques and its urban dimensions. I argue that the Gazi incidents of 1995 marked the beginning of a new counterinsurgency strategy in Istanbul that combined overt repressive state violence with urban-centred and affect-generating provocative counterinsurgency techniques in an attempt to quell the growing left-wing mobilization and subvert the Turkish and Kurdish left-wing alignment, which was drawing closer at the time. That new strategy was informed by the principles of the low-intensity conflict doctrine—more specifically, by Britain’s counterinsurgency warfare in Northern Ireland —that came to prevail during the Cold War era. Utilizing a concept I call provocative counterorganization—that is, provocation of individual and communal fear, intercommunal conflict, and ethnosectarian discord by national security states in order to refashion a population’s dissent against the state—I show how provocative counterorganizational strategies work to inform and shape dissent by provoking counterviolence and ethnosectarian discord.

摘要

本文将土耳其的镇压行动置于冷战镇压叛乱的全球背景下，阐明了镇压叛乱的挑衅和影响产生技术及其城市维度。我认为，1995 年的加齐事件标志着伊斯坦布尔新的反叛乱战略的开始，该战略将公开的镇压国家暴力与以城市为中心和产生影响的挑衅性反叛乱技术相结合，以试图平息日益增长的左翼动员并颠覆土耳其和当时正在拉近距离的库尔德左翼联盟。冷战时期盛行的低强度冲突原则——更具体地说，是英国在北爱尔兰的反叛乱战争——为这一新战略提供了依据。利用我称之为的概念挑衅性反组织——即国家安全国家挑起个人和社区恐惧、社区间冲突和种族宗派不和，以重塑民众对国家的异议——我展示了挑衅性反组织策略如何通过激起反暴力和民族宗派的不和。