In the Dutch health care system of managed competition, insurers and mental health providers negotiate on prices for mental health services. Contract prices are capped by a regulator who sets a maximum price for each mental health service. In 2013, the majority of the contract prices equaled these maximum prices. We study price setting after a major policy change in 2014. In 2014, mental health care providers had to negotiate prices with each individual health insurer separately, instead of with all insurers collectively as in 2013. Moreover, after a cost‐price revision, the regulator increased in 2014 maximum prices by about 10%. Insurers and mental health providers reacted to this policy change by setting most contract prices below the new maximum prices. We find that in 2014 mental health providers with more market power, that is, a higher willingness‐to‐pay measure, contracted significantly higher prices. Some insurers negotiated significantly lower prices than other insurers but these differences are unrelated to an insurers' market share.

中文翻译：

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精神卫生保健的价格和市场力量：来自荷兰重大政策变化的证据

在荷兰管理竞争的医疗保健系统中，保险公司和心理健康提供者就心理健康服务的价格进行谈判。合同价格由监管机构设定上限，监管机构为每项心理健康服务设定了最高价格。2013 年，大部分合同价格等于这些最高价格。我们研究了 2014 年重大政策变化后的价格设定。 2014 年，精神卫生保健提供者不得不单独与每个医疗保险公司协商价格，而不是像 2013 年那样与所有保险公司共同协商价格。此外，在成本价格调整后，监管机构在 2014 年将最高价格提高了约 10%。保险公司和心理健康提供者通过将大多数合同价格设置为低于新的最高价格来应对这一政策变化。我们发现，在 2014 年，具有更多市场支配力的心理健康服务提供者，即，更高的支付意愿措施，导致价格大幅上涨。一些保险公司的谈判价格明显低于其他保险公司，但这些差异与保险公司的市场份额无关。