We show that on the domain of convex games, Dutta-Ray’s egalitarian solution is characterized by core selection, aggregate monotonicity, and bounded richness, a new property requiring that the poorest players cannot be made richer within the core. Replacing “poorest” by “poorer” allows to eliminate aggregate monotonicity. Moreover, we show that the egalitarian solution is characterized by constrained welfare egalitarianism and either bilateral consistency à la Davis and Maschler or, together with individual rationality, by bilateral consistency à la Hart and Mas-Colell.

中文翻译：

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Dutta-Ray 等式解在凸博弈域上的公理化

我们表明，在凸博弈领域，Dutta-Ray 的均等解决方案的特点是核心选择、聚合单调性和有限的丰富性，这是一种新属性，要求最贫穷的玩家不能在核心内变得更富有。用“更差”代替“最差”可以消除聚合单调性。此外，我们表明，平等主义解决方案的特点是受约束的福利平等主义，或者像戴维斯和马施勒那样的双边一致性，或者与个人理性一起，表现为像哈特和马斯-科莱尔那样的双边一致性。