We study the econometrics of an asymmetric Tullock contest model with incomplete information. Identification results are established for parameters in the asymmetric contest success function and for the quantile functions of players' private costs. We propose the corresponding estimators, derive the asymptotic properties, and demonstrate their good finite sample performances by simulation. We also propose an easy-to-implement parametric estimation method that can incorporate contest-specific covariates. Our method is used to study U.S. House of Representatives elections. We quantify the incumbency advantages and conduct policy experiments to evaluate how imposing a term limit or launching campaign finance reforms affects incumbency advantage.

中文翻译：

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应用美国众议院选举的 TULLOCK 竞赛的结构分析

我们研究具有不完整信息的非对称 Tullock 竞赛模型的计量经济学。为非对称竞赛成功函数中的参数和玩家私人成本的分位数函数建立了识别结果。我们提出了相应的估计量，推导了渐近特性，并通过仿真证明了它们良好的有限样本性能。我们还提出了一种易于实现的参数估计方法，该方法可以包含特定于比赛的协变量。我们的方法用于研究美国众议院选举。我们量化在职优势并进行政策实验，以评估施加任期限制或启动竞选财务改革如何影响在职优势。