Abstract

Why does the imposition of trade sanctions sometimes lead to the signing of new preferential trade agreements (PTAs) between target countries and their trade partners? I argue that the occurrence of trade-based sanctions-busting behavior increases the likelihood of signing new PTAs despite the pressure from senders of sanctions. The notion that “trade plants the flag” explains how firms that bust sanctions lobby their home governments for signing PTAs to secure their first-mover advantage in a sanctioned market. By using rare event models and weighting methods, this empirical analysis of data from 1950 to 2006 reveals that firms’ rent-seeking behavior is the driving force of seeking PTAs especially during multilateral trade sanctions. Thus, this finding can illuminate sanctions agenda as firm-level transactions may serve as a determinant of state-led institutionalized cooperation after the execution of sanctions.

中文翻译：

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贸易树立旗帜：制裁制裁和新优惠贸易协定的签署

摘要

为什么实施贸易制裁有时会导致目标国家与其贸易伙伴之间签署新的优惠贸易协定（PTA）？我认为，尽管制裁发送者施加了压力，但基于贸易的制裁破坏行为的发生增加了签署新的PTA的可能性。“以贸易换旗”的概念解释了破产制裁的公司如何游说其本国政府签署PTA，以确保他们在制裁市场中拥有先发优势。通过使用罕见事件模型和加权方法，对1950年至2006年数据的经验分析表明，企业的寻租行为是寻求PTA的驱动力，尤其是在多边贸易制裁期间。从而，