ABSTRACT

This article assesses the scope and content of the automatic exceptions contained in Article 297 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea to the compulsory procedures established in Section 2 of Part XV. The Convention's drafting history is examined with a view to determining the validity of the diametrically opposed readings of Article 297(1) endorsed by Annex VII Tribunals in the Southern Bluefin Tuna Award and the Chagos Marine Protected Area (MPA) Award. The interpretation favoured in the Chagos MPA Award—that mandatory jurisdiction is not restricted to the three cases expressly enumerated in Article 297(1)—is consistent with the textual evolution of Part XV. The article situates the approach adopted by the Chagos Tribunal within a wider normative tradition, which holds that adjudicative jurisdiction arises in default of positive textual authorzsation (unless it has been explicitly excluded). It is argued that this approach should be embraced by courts and tribunals when interpreting the Convention's provisions, as it accords with the drafters' aspirations and it serves to strengthen the international Rule of Law.

摘要

本文评估了联合国海洋法公约第297条第XV部分第2节规定的强制性程序中自动例外的范围和内容。对《公约》的起草历史进行了审查，目的是确定附件七法庭在南部蓝鳍金枪鱼奖和查戈斯海洋保护区奖中认可的第297（1）条截然相反的解读的有效性。Chagos MPA裁决赞成的解释是，强制管辖权不限于第297（1）条明确列举的三个案件，这与第XV部分的案文演变相一致。该条将查戈斯法庭采用的方法置于更广泛的规范传统中，裁定司法管辖权产生于肯定的文本授权（除非已明确排除）。有人认为，在解释《公约》的规定时，法院和法庭应采用这种方法，因为它符合起草者的愿望，并有助于加强国际法治。