This article traces how differing perspectives on the sinking of the French battleship Bouvet ultimately denied the Ottoman artillery credit for the success. The official British account would attribute the defeat to ‘floating mines’ and to the ‘luck’ of the Turks in March 1915 first, and later to the Nusret’s minefield when they published their official history in 1921. Following the Great War and the occupation of Istanbul, the Ottoman officers who participated in the naval operations revised their own accounts and imported the British official narrative of the event. In understanding this overlooked case using newly disclosed Ottoman and German accounts, we can analyse how the losers’ historiography is vulnerable to overt influence from the victors’ hegemonic official historiography.

本文追溯了对法国战舰Bouvet沉没的不同看法，最终他们否认了奥斯曼炮兵的成功。英国官方的说法将失败归因于1915年3月土耳其人的“浮动地雷”和“运气”，后来归因于Nusret他们在1921年公布其官方历史时的雷区。在第一次世界大战和对伊斯坦布尔的占领之后，参加海军行动的奥斯曼帝国军官修改了自己的帐户，并输入了该事件的英国官方叙述。在使用新近披露的奥斯曼帝国和德国的账目了解这一被忽视的案例时，我们可以分析失败者的史学如何容易受到胜利者霸权官方史学的明显影响。