Many different types of organization provide public services or goods and build public works without being, strictly speaking, part of government. Such entities tend to be seen as more innovative than government proper, both because of their organizational autonomy and because they primarily use private‐law techniques (contracts, mainly) and lay claim to private sector credentials. This article examines the presumed correlation between moves towards greater public‐private hybridity in government and public sector innovation, using illustrative examples from Ontario and British Columbia, Canada. Combining interviews with professional infrastructure deal‐makers, direct observation of public infrastructure workshops, and analyses of the documents that constitute infrastructure deals, we show that the quest to bring virtues and techniques associated with private enterprise to the delivery and governance of public goods and services often leads to a dialectical reversal. At first, bureaucratic rules do give way to the pursuit of more or less sui generis deals. But the entities that initiate deals and partnerships soon come to feel the need to standardize the process, which then leads to the return of standard templates and surprisingly rigid rules.

中文翻译：

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“交易的艺术”时代的基础设施治理：治理逻辑和可视性规模

严格来说，许多不同类型的组织提供的公共服务或商品和公共工程都没有成为政府的一部分。这类实体往往被视为比政府应有的创新性，这既是因为它们具有组织自主性，又是因为它们主要使用私法技术（主要是合同），并要求获得私营部门的资格证书。本文使用加拿大安大略省和加拿大不列颠哥伦比亚省的说明性示例，考察了政府在实现更大的公私混合性与公共部门创新之间的假定关系。结合对专业基础设施交易者的访谈，对公共基础设施研讨会的直接观察以及对构成基础设施交易的文档的分析，我们表明，寻求将与私营企业相关的美德和技术带入公共产品和服务的交付和治理中，往往会导致辩证性的逆转。首先，官僚主义的规则确实让位于或多或少的特殊交易。但是发起交易和建立合作伙伴关系的实体很快就感到需要标准化流程，从而导致返回标准模板和出乎意料的严格规则。