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How do the ownership structure and board of directors' features impact earnings management? The Spanish case
Journal of International Financial Management & Accounting ( IF 2.808 ) Pub Date : 2020-01-07 , DOI: 10.1111/jifm.12114
Paolo Saona 1, 2 , Laura Muro 1 , María Alvarado 3
Affiliation  

This paper examines how the ownership structure and board of directors' features determine the managerial opportunistic behavior exemplified in the management of accounting earnings. This study contributes to the literature by investigating the relationship of firm‐level and country‐level corporate governance systems on the earnings management in the Spanish corporate sector. Results reveal that the varying efficiency of the corporate governance systems is reflected in the way in which accounting discretion is performed. We found evidence that earnings management is reduced as the voting rights of the controlling shareholder increased and that there is an inverse U‐shaped relationship between insiders' ownership and the earnings manipulation. Regarding the board characteristics, we observe that larger, independent boards, those with a larger proportion of female members, and those with an audit committee compounded by a greater proportion of outside independent directors oversee managers more efficiently, constraining their capacity to manage earnings. To the contrary, board duality increases the likelihood of opportunistic manipulation of financial reporting. We found that when the institutional environment improves in the Spanish context, the discretionary power of the corporate sector to overstate the financial statements is reduced. The findings prove the necessity of reinforcing the rules and regulations toward a more transparent disclosure of the financial statements.

中文翻译:

所有权结构和董事会特征如何影响盈余管理?西班牙案

本文研究了所有权结构和董事会特征如何确定会计收益管理中的管理机会主义行为。这项研究通过调查公司级和国家级公司治理体系与西班牙公司部门盈余管理之间的关系,为文献做出了贡献。结果表明,公司治理体系效率的变化体现在执行会计自由裁量权的方式上。我们发现有证据表明,随着控股股东投票权的增加,盈余管理会减少,而且内部人所有权和盈余操纵之间存在U型倒数关系。关于板子的特性,我们观察到较大的独立板子 那些女性成员比例较高的人,以及设有审计委员会并由较大比例的外部独立董事所组成的人员,将更有效地监督经理,从而限制了她们管理收入的能力。相反,董事会的双重性增加了机会主义操纵财务报告的可能性。我们发现,当西班牙环境中的制度环境改善时,公司部门夸大财务报表的酌处权就会降低。调查结果证明有必要加强规则和条例,以使财务报表的披露更加透明。限制了他们的收入管理能力。相反,董事会二重性增加了机会主义操作财务报告的可能性。我们发现,当西班牙环境中的制度环境改善时,公司部门夸大财务报表的酌处权就会降低。调查结果证明有必要加强规则和条例,以使财务报表的披露更加透明。限制了他们的收入管理能力。相反,董事会二重性增加了机会主义操作财务报告的可能性。我们发现,当西班牙环境中的制度环境改善时,公司部门夸大财务报表的酌处权就会降低。调查结果证明有必要加强规则和条例,以使财务报表的披露更加透明。
更新日期:2020-01-07
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