There have been many attempts to define care in terms of the virtues, but meta‐analyses of these attempts are conspicuously absent from the literature. No taxonomies have been offered to situate them within the broader care ethical and virtue theoretical discourses, nor have any substantial discussions of each option's merits and shortcomings. I attempt to fill this lacuna by presenting an analysis of the claim that care is a virtue (what I call the “virtue thesis” about care). I begin by distinguishing weaker and stronger versions of the virtue thesis, arguing that the weaker version is an orthodox view among care ethicists. I then go on to develop a taxonomy of approaches available to care ethicists seeking to flesh out the virtue thesis. The three I identify are analogical approaches, according to which care is analogous to some existing virtue; supplementalist approaches, according to which care is a novel virtue; and cardinalist approaches, according to which care is a cardinal virtue. Following this, I defend the virtue thesis from some foreseeable objections and argue that its most promising version is analogical.

中文翻译：

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关怀的美德

有很多尝试根据美德来定义护理，但是这些尝试的荟萃分析在文献中明显缺乏。没有提供分类法来将其置于更广泛的护理伦理和美德理论论述之内，也没有对每种选择的优缺点进行实质性讨论。我试图通过对所谓护理是一种美德（我称其为护理的“虚拟论点”）的主张进行分析来填补这一空白。首先，我将区分美德论的弱者和强者，认为弱者是护理伦理学家的正统观点。然后，我将继续开发一种分类方法，以帮助寻求充实美德论点的伦理学家。我确定的三个是类比方法，根据哪种照顾类似于某种现有的美德；补充方法，照料是一种新的美德；和基调主义者的方法，根据这种方法，关怀是主要的美德。在此之后，我从一些可预见的异议中为美德论辩护，并辩称其最有前途的版本是类推。