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Optimal environmental taxation in response to an environmentally-unfriendly political challenger
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management ( IF 5.840 ) Pub Date : 2021-01-22 , DOI: 10.1016/j.jeem.2020.102407
Gal Hochman , David Zilberman

Different political parties place different values on the environment. In considering a two-party democratic system and capital-intensive technologies, we find that forward-looking governments incorporate the probability of losing power into their policy design. When the party in power values the environment, it may levy an optimal dynamic tax that is larger than the Pigouvian tax. We investigate the parameters that affect the magnitude of this gap and assess the effect of the gap on the adoption of clean technologies overtime.



中文翻译:

应对环境不友好的政治挑战者的最佳环境税收

不同的政党对环境有不同的价值观。在考虑两党民主制度和资本密集型技术时,我们发现前瞻性政府将失去权力的可能性纳入其政策设计中。当执政党重视环境时,可能会征收比庇古税更大的最优动态税。我们调查了影响这一差距幅度的参数,并评估了差距对清洁技术超时采用的影响。

更新日期:2021-02-01
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