In this article, we examine corporate investment decisions in a model with short selling. We show that high short-selling activities can cause firms to overinvest and that the agency problems between managers and shareholders drive this overinvestment. Empirically, we find that short interest is positively associated with subsequent corporate investment and that the effect of short-selling activities on investment is stronger when the sensitivity of chief executive officer compensation to stock price performance is greater. The results are not explained by short-sale constraints or firm overvaluation. Additionally, short-selling-induced corporate investments can partly explain the negative relation between both short interest and corporate investment with subsequent stock returns.

中文翻译：

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卖空、代理和企业投资

在本文中，我们将在一个带有卖空的模型中研究企业投资决策。我们表明，高卖空活动会导致公司过度投资，而经理和股东之间的代理问题会导致这种过度投资。实证上，我们发现做空兴趣与随后的公司投资呈正相关，当首席执行官薪酬对股价表现的敏感性越大时，卖空活动对投资的影响越强。结果不能用卖空限制或公司高估来解释。此外，卖空引发的企业投资可以部分解释空头利息与企业投资与后续股票收益之间的负相关关系。