Although cross-shareholding has increasingly been adopted in the industry to improve strategic synergy between companies, its role in the green supply chain is seldom investigated. By employing a Stackelberg game model, this paper investigates how the mechanism of cross-shareholding affects operational behaviour in a green supply chain. Specifically, we examine how cross-shareholding affects pricing strategies, carbon emissions reduction and profit in two supply chain models with different power structures, namely the manufacturer-dominated supply chain (MD model) and the retailer-dominated supply chain (RD model). We find that both the manufacturer and the retailer in the green supply chain reduce more carbon emissions after cross-shareholding. Both the manufacturer and the retailer can earn greater profits than would be possible in a decentralised supply chain when the proportion of cross-shareholding meets a certain threshold. Furthermore, our results show that the ratio of carbon emissions reduction between the manufacturer and the retailer in the cross-shareholding supply chain is affected by the proportion of shares and the power structure. In the MD model, carbon emissions reduction is positively affected by the proportion of the manufacturer's shares held by the retailer. In the RD model, it is negatively affected by the proportion of the retailer's shares held by the manufacturer. A revenue-sharing contract can be adopted to improve the performance of the cross-shareholding supply chain. Our results have important managerial implications for companies who intend to improve their environmental and financial performances through cross-shareholding when a centralised decision is difficult to achieve.

尽管行业内越来越多地采用交叉持股来改善公司之间的战略协同效应，但很少研究其在绿色供应链中的作用。通过采用Stackelberg博弈模型，本文研究了交叉持股机制如何影响绿色供应链中的运营行为。具体来说，我们研究了交叉持股对两个具有不同权力结构的供应链模型（即制造商主导的供应链（MD模型）和零售商主导的供应链（RD模型））如何影响定价策略，碳排放减少和利润。我们发现，绿色供应链中的制造商和零售商在交叉持股后都减少了更多的碳排放。当交叉持股比例达到一定阈值时，制造商和零售商都可以获得比分散式供应链中更高的利润。此外，我们的结果表明，交叉持股的供应链中制造商和零售商之间的碳排放减少比例受股份比例和权力结构的影响。在MD模型中，减少碳排放量受到零售商持有的制造商股份比例的积极影响。在RD模型中，它受到制造商持有的零售商股份比例的负面影响。可以采用收入共享合同来改善交叉持股供应链的绩效。