Evidence from monetary VARs suggests that in the U.S., Canada, and the U.K. the impact of monetary shocks on real house prices is about three to five times as large as that on real GDP. Although these trade-offs are not manifestly unfavorable, in the light of the large differences in the magnitudes of house prices and GDP fluctuations, a monetary policy of leaning against the former would inevitably entail significant losses in the latter. I use the identified VARs in order to explore the corresponding trade-offs associated with a monetary policy of weakly, but systematically leaning against house prices. Results from ‘modest’ (in the sense of Leeper and Zha, 2003) policy counterfactuals suggest that, in population, the impact on real house prices is about three times as large as that on real GDP for all of the three countries. Within the specific context of the upsurge in U.S. house prices which pre-dated the financial crisis, a shortfall of one per cent of GDP would have been associated with a decline in real house prices by about four per cent.

货币VAR的证据表明，在美国，加拿大和英国，货币冲击对实际房价的影响大约是对实际GDP的三到五倍。尽管这些权衡并非明显不利，但鉴于房价幅度和GDP波动之间的巨大差异，偏重前者的货币政策不可避免地会给后者带来重大损失。我使用已识别的增值经销商，以探索与货币政策相对弱势但系统地倾向于房价的权衡取舍。“适度”（根据Leeper和Zha，2003年）政策反事实的结果表明，在人口方面，这三个国家对实际房价的影响大约是对实际GDP的三倍。