Many negotiations involve risks that are resolved ex-post. Often these risks are not incurred equally by the parties involved. We experimentally investigate bargaining situations where a residual claimant faces ex-post risk, whereas a fixed-payoff player does not. Consistent with a benchmark model, we find that residual claimants extract a risk premium, which increases in risk exposure. This premium can be high enough to make it beneficial to bargain over a risky rather than a risk-less pie. Contrary to the model's predictions, we find that the comparatively less risk averse residual claimants benefit the most from risk exposure. This is because fixed-payoff players' adopt weak bargaining strategies when the pie is risky. We find evidence for a behavioural mechanism where asymmetric exposure to risk between the two parties creates a wedge between their fairness ideas, which shifts agreements in favour of residual claimants but also increases bargaining friction.

许多谈判涉及事后解决的风险。通常，有关各方不会平等地承担这些风险。我们通过实验调查了讨价还价的情况，在该情况下，剩余索偿人面临事后风险，而固定报酬参与者则没有。与基准模型一致，我们发现剩余索偿人提取了风险溢价，从而增加了风险敞口。该溢价可能足够高，以使其有利于讨价还价，而不是无风险的馅饼。与模型的预测相反，我们发现相对较少的风险厌恶剩余索赔人从风险敞口中受益最大。这是因为当派彩有风险时，固定收益玩家会采取弱小的议价策略。