This paper analyses the choice of subsidy offered to a vaccine supply chain with a risk-averse buyer. We find that for a higher innovation effort and level of social benefits, the per-unit production subsidy is better when there is a low innovation cost coefficient, a low level of risk aversion, or a high potential demand. Otherwise, under the opposite conditions, the R&D innovation effort subsidy should be selected. Furthermore, from an evolutionary game theoretical perspective, we also present the stability performance for the subsidies, and the results show that when the manufacturer’s innovation cost coefficient is relatively low, the more profitable per-unit production subsidy may be abandoned due to its performance instability.

本文分析了向风险规避买家提供的疫苗供应链补贴的选择。我们发现，对于更高的创新努力和社会效益水平，当创新成本系数低、风险规避水平低或潜在需求高时，单位生产补贴更好。否则，在相反条件下，应选择研发创新投入补贴。此外，我们还从演化博弈论的角度给出了补贴的稳定性表现，结果表明，当制造商的创新成本系数较低时，利润较高的单产补贴可能因其表现不稳定而被放弃。 .