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Transfer program enforcement and children’s time allocation
Review of Economics of the Household ( IF 2.943 ) Pub Date : 2021-01-16 , DOI: 10.1007/s11150-020-09531-w
Rodrigo Ceni , Gonzalo Salas

We examine levels of enforcement of conditions for two transfer programs and estimate how they affect teenagers’ time allocation, and in particular, time devoted to school attendance, labor supply and home production. We develop a structural discrete choice model in which young individuals and their parents decide how to allocate their time, including whether to attend school. They also choose how many hours to work in the market, how much time to devote to home production and leisure activity. To estimate the model, we use household panel data which combines administrative records and surveys covering the period of 2005–2012 in Uruguay, during which two consecutive CCT programs were introduced with different designs. Our model captures the share of individuals who are in school, who are working, who are both studying and working, as well as those who neither study nor work; we also capture the share and number of hours devoted to market work and home production, and individuals’ GPA distribution. The policy experiments performed indicate that school attendance can be increased by raising the level of enforcement and by sending the cash transfer to the teenagers rather than to their parents.



中文翻译:

转移计划执行和孩子的时间分配

我们研究了两个转移计划的条件执行程度,并估计它们如何影响青少年的时间分配,尤其是花在上学,劳动力供应和家庭生产上的时间。我们开发了一个结构化的离散选择模型,其中年轻人和他们的父母决定如何分配他们的时间,包括是否上学。他们还选择在市场上工作几个小时,花多少时间从事家庭生产和休闲活动。为了评估该模型,我们使用了住户面板数据,该数据结合了乌拉圭2005-2012年期间的行政记录和调查,在此期间引入了两个采用不同设计的连续CCT计划。我们的模型捕获了在校,工作,学习和工作的个人所占的份额,以及既不学习也不工作的人;我们还将获取用于市场工作和家庭生产以及个人GPA分配的份额和小时数。进行的政策实验表明,可以通过提高执法水平和将现金转移支付给青少年而不是父母,来增加入学率。

更新日期:2021-01-18
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