ABSTRACT

Credible commitment is central to regimes for climate mitigation policy. In the climate policy literature, it is widely argued that the solution to the credible commitment problem is legislation and delegation of goal-setting to a technical body insulated from political incentives, and the UK’s Committee on Climate Change is in part modelled on this approach. However, drawing on the comparative politics literature, this paper argues that the focus on legislation and delegation as the solution to the credible commitment problem is too narrow. Seen within the context of comparative political institutions, it is a response that fits the political logic in countries with majoritarian electoral systems. By contrast, in countries with electoral systems based on proportional representation, while legislation plays a role, an important element in the creation of credible commitment comes in the form of negotiated long-term agreements between political parties. This contrast is explored through a comparison between the Climate Change Act and associated Committee on Climate Change in the UK on the one hand, and a series of Energy and Climate Agreements in Denmark over the 2010s. Both approaches appear to have worked to date. However, while negotiated long-term agreements typically have an internal process for managing conflicts that inevitably arise after the respective mechanisms have been put in place, disputes arising following legislation and delegation must be resolved within the more informal processes of intra-party politics. Mechanisms of accountability also differ between the two approaches.

Key policy insights

• Legislation and delegation is widely seen as the key route to credible commitment for climate policy, but other routes are possible.

• Legislation and delegation is particularly suited to countries with majoritarian, or first-past-the-post electoral systems and resulting political dynamics.

• In countries with proportional representation, an alternative route to credible commitment is possible via formal agreement between political parties.

• Both routes can work well, but political agreements tend to have internal mechanisms for mediating conflicts that subsequently arise, whereas delegation relies on intra-party politics.

摘要

可信的承诺是气候减缓政策制度的核心。在气候政策文献中，人们普遍认为，可信承诺问题的解决方案是立法和将目标设定委托给与政治激励无关的技术机构，英国气候变化委员会部分模仿了这种方法。然而，借鉴比较政治文献，本文认为将立法和授权作为可信承诺问题的解决方案的重点过于狭隘。在比较政治制度的背景下，这是一种符合多数选举制度国家政治逻辑的回应。相比之下，在以比例代表制为基础的选举制度的国家，虽然立法发挥了作用，建立可信承诺的一个重要因素是政党之间谈判达成的长期协议。这种对比一方面是通过比较英国的气候变化法案和相关的气候变化委员会，以及 2010 年代丹麦的一系列能源和气候协议。迄今为止，这两种方法似乎都奏效了。然而，虽然经谈判达成的长期协议通常有一个内部程序来管理在各自机制到位后不可避免地出现的冲突，但在立法和授权之后产生的争端必须在更非正式的党内政治程序中解决。这两种方法的问责机制也不同。

关键政策见解

• 立法和授权被广泛视为对气候政策做出可信承诺的关键途径，但其他途径也是可能的。

• 立法和授权特别适用于拥有多数派或优先选举制度以及由此产生的政治动态的国家。

• 在具有比例代表制的国家，通过政党之间的正式协议，可以选择另一种途径来做出可信的承诺。

• 两条路线都可以很好地运作，但政治协议往往有内部机制来调解随后出现的冲突，而授权则依赖于党内政治。