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Dynamic Belief Elicitation
Econometrica ( IF 6.1 ) Pub Date : 2021-01-15 , DOI: 10.3982/ecta15293
Christopher P. Chambers 1 , Nicolas S. Lambert 2
Affiliation  

At an initial time, an individual forms a belief about a future random outcome. As time passes, the individual may obtain, privately or subjectively, further information, until the outcome is eventually revealed. How can a protocol be devised that induces the individual, as a strict best response, to reveal at the outset his prior assessment of both the final outcome and the information flows he anticipates and, subsequently, what information he privately receives? The protocol can provide the individual with payoffs that depend only on the outcome realization and his reports. We develop a framework to design such protocols, and apply it to construct simple elicitation mechanisms for common dynamic environments. The framework is general: we show that strategyproof protocols exist for any number of periods and large outcome sets. For these more general settings, we build a family of strategyproof protocols based on a hierarchy of choice menus, and show that any strategyproof protocol can be approximated by a protocol of this family.

中文翻译:

动态信念启发

最初,个人对未来的随机结果形成了信念。随着时间的流逝,个人可以私下或主观地获取更多信息,直到最终显示结果。如何设计一种方案,以诱使个人作为严格的最佳反应,从一开始就透露其对最终结果和他预期的信息流的事先评估,以及随后他私下收到的信息?该协议可以为个人提供仅取决于结果实现及其报告的收益。我们开发了一个框架来设计此类协议,并将其应用于构建常见动态环境的简单引发机制。该框架是通用的:我们证明存在各种阶段和大量结果集的策略验证协议。
更新日期:2021-01-16
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