Central banks in emerging countries frequently build-up (diminish) reserves while attempting to depreciate (appreciate) their currencies. Even if these interventions are effective, they often entail various costs. Basu (2012), nonetheless, proposes a model in which the sole announcement of an intervention schedule leads to a desired exchange rate without actually buying or selling foreign currency. In this paper, we present a generalization that allows for imperfect credibility of promises. Namely, market dealers know that the central bank carries strategic incentives when announcing its schedule and may not perfectly believe it. We show that, under this setup, it may be impossible to achieve the targeted rate without changing the level of international reserves. However, committing to a schedule, despite being imperfectly credible, outperforms unannounced discretionary interventions. This is the case because it reduces the amount of foreign currency trading required for a central bank to meet its desired exchange rate.

中文翻译：

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言外之意：不完全信用下的外汇干预

新兴国家的中央银行经常在试图贬值（升值）其货币的同时积累（减少）储备。即使这些干预措施是有效的，它们通常也会带来各种成本。尽管如此，Basu (2012) 提出了一个模型，在该模型中，仅宣布干预计划就可以导致所需的汇率，而无需实际买卖外币。在本文中，我们提出了一个概括，允许承诺的不完全可信度。也就是说，市场交易商知道央行在宣布其时间表时带有战略激励，可能并不完全相信。我们表明，在这种设置下，不改变国际储备水平可能无法实现目标利率。然而，尽管不完全可信，但要遵守时间表，优于未经宣布的任意干预。之所以如此，是因为它减少了中央银行满足其所需汇率所需的外币交易量。