Abstract

Taste-based discrimination (i.e. discrimination due to racist preferences) receives more attention than statistical discrimination in the enforcement literature, because the latter allows enforcers to increase their “success rates.” I show here that when enforcers’ incentives can be altered via liabilities and rewards, all types of discrimination reduce deterrence. Moreover, adverse effects of statistical discrimination on deterrence are more persistent than similar effects due to taste-based discrimination. I identify crime minimizing liabilities and rewards when enforcers engage in racial discrimination and consider the robustness of the analysis in alternative settings.

中文翻译：

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执法人员的歧视与威慑

摘要

在执法文献中，基于口味的歧视（即由于种族主义偏好引起的歧视）比统计歧视受到更多的关注，因为后者使执法者能够提高其“成功率”。我在这里表明，当执行者的激励可以通过责任和报酬来改变时，所有类型的歧视都会降低威慑力。此外，由于基于口味的歧视，统计歧视对威慑的不利影响比类似影响更为持久。当执法人员进行种族歧视时，我会确定将犯罪最小化的责任和报酬，并考虑在其他情况下分析的稳健性。