This article analyses the evolving nature and dynamics of the relationship between the centre and the periphery by examining how semi-democratic reforms have shaped and influenced the peace negotiation process between the government and ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) since 2011. We demonstrate that while the 2008 constitution has reduced restrictions on political, economic, and cultural activities in Myanmar, it has also inevitably produced a ‘two-headed government’ after the main opposition party, the National League for Democracy (NLD), took charge in 2016 and was forced to share power with the military. This ‘two-headed’ government is the result of the historical distrust between the NLD and the army, combined with the NLD's lack of a clear strategy in dealing with EAOs. This has enabled the army to assert its well-articulated and hardline approach—without itself having an effective strategy or the capacity to end the country's armed insurgencies or bring the peace process forward. We show that the split at the centre has produced inertia and weakened the ability of the central government to formulate and implement effective policy, and further undermined the prospects for national reconciliation. Situating this case study within the wider literature of centre–periphery relationships and democratic transition, this article offers a nuanced and comprehensive analysis of how specific institutional arrangements at the centre in semi-democratic settings affect relations in both the centre and the periphery, as well as centre–periphery relationships.

中文翻译：

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破碎的中心：“双头政府”和对缅甸和平进程的威胁

本文通过考察 2011 年以来半民主改革如何塑造和影响政府与民族武装组织 (EAO) 之间的和平谈判进程，分析了中心与外围关系的演变性质和动态。我们证明，虽然2008年宪法减少了对缅甸政治、经济和文化活动的限制，在主要反对党全国民主联盟（NLD）2016年上台后，也不可避免地产生了“双头政府”。与军队分享权力。这种“双头”政府是民盟与军队之间历史上不信任的结果，再加上民盟在应对EAO方面缺乏明确的战略。这使军队能够坚持其明确和强硬的方法——而它本身却没有有效的战略或能力来结束该国的武装叛乱或推动和平进程。我们表明，中央的分裂产生了惯性，削弱了中央政府制定和实施有效政策的能力，进一步破坏了民族和解的前景。将本案例研究置于更广泛的中心-边缘关系和民主转型文献中，本文对半民主环境下中心的具体制度安排如何影响中心和边缘的关系进行了细致入微的全面分析，以及作为中心-边缘关系。