Short: We hypothesize that companies with board‐level employee representation (BLER) experience a lower probability of crisis‐induced dismissals than other firms. Theoretically, we link this effect to the employee directors’ ability to reduce the information asymmetry and moral hazard in employee–employer contracting, thereby facilitating the implementation of labor‐cost adjustments that are an alternative to workforce dismissals. We confirm our hypotheses by analyzing the behavior of Scandinavian public corporations with/without employee directors during the Great Recession.

中文翻译：

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董事会级别的员工代表（BLER）和企业对危机的反应

简短：我们假设具有董事会级员工代表（BLER）的公司遭受危机导致的解雇的可能性比其他公司低。从理论上讲，我们将此影响与员工董事减少员工与雇主签约中的信息不对称和道德风险的能力联系在一起，从而促进了替代劳动力解雇的劳动力成本调整的实施。我们通过分析斯堪的纳维亚上市公司在大萧条期间有/没有雇员董事的行为来证实我们的假设。