We survey the use of financial performance measures in determining executive pay among significant Australian financial institutions. We document evidence of the pervasiveness with which externally disclosed non‐GAAP (non‐Generally Accepted Accounting Principles) financial measures are also used internally to determine variable remuneration, with the apparent popularity of cash profit after tax in short‐term incentives plans. Our evidence also highlights the increasing use of peer group‐adjusted measures (e.g., relative cash earnings per share and return on equity ranking against a peer group) in determining longer‐run incentives, despite the fact that members of the peer group do not measure financial performance in a directly comparable manner. Detailed analysis of the four major trading banks (Australia and New Zealand Banking Group, Commonwealth Bank, National Australia Bank and Westpac) reveals differences in the way non‐GAAP earnings measures are calculated across the major banks, as well as some variation over time in the way individual banks measure performance. We also document evidence of non‐GAAP earnings restatements, with around 25% of non‐GAAP results subsequently being restated. These restatements are more likely to result in a downward revision of the initially reported non‐GAAP result than an upward revision. We therefore conclude that existing measures of financial performance used to determine senior executive compensation are not as ‘objective’, as might be assumed.

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高管薪酬和财务绩效指标：来自重要金融机构的证据

我们调查了财务绩效指标在确定澳大利亚主要金融机构中高管薪酬方面的使用情况。我们记录了外部披露的非公认会计原则（非公认会计原则）财务指标在内部用于确定可变薪酬的普遍性证据，税后现金利润在短期激励计划中明显流行。我们的证据还强调，在确定长期激励措施时，尽管同级组的成员未进行衡量，但在同级组调整后的度量（例如相对于同级组的相对每股现金收益和股本回报率排名）中的使用越来越多财务业绩可直接比较。对四大贸易银行（澳大利亚和新西兰银行集团，联邦银行，澳大利亚国民银行和西太平洋银行（Westpac）揭示了各主要银行的非GAAP收益衡量方法的计算差异，以及各家银行衡量绩效的方式随时间的变化。我们还记录了非GAAP收益重述的证据，随后约有25％的非GAAP结果重述。与向上修订相比，这些重述更有可能导致对最初报告的非GAAP结果进行向下修订。因此，我们得出的结论是，用于确定高级管理人员薪酬的现有财务绩效衡量指标并不像假设的那样“客观”。以及各个银行衡量绩效的方式随时间变化。我们还记录了非GAAP收益重述的证据，随后约有25％的非GAAP结果重述。与向上修订相比，这些重述更有可能导致对最初报告的非GAAP结果进行向下修订。因此，我们得出的结论是，用于确定高级管理人员薪酬的现有财务绩效衡量指标并不像假设的那样“客观”。以及各个银行衡量绩效的方式随时间变化。我们还记录了非GAAP收益重述的证据，随后约有25％的非GAAP结果重述。与向上修订相比，这些重述更有可能导致对最初报告的非GAAP结果进行向下修订。因此，我们得出的结论是，用于确定高级管理人员薪酬的现有财务绩效衡量指标并不像假设的那样“客观”。