This study investigates whether and how a regulatory change in the appointment procedure of audit committees affects firms’ choice of an auditor or a voluntary audit committee. It also investigates whether voluntary audit committees improve earnings quality. We find that relatively larger medium‐sized firms with high ownership concentration establish voluntary audit committees to reinforce the control of major shareholders and that these audit committees do not improve financial reporting. Our result that audit committees do not necessarily improve financial reporting calls for policymakers and capital market participants to devote greater attention to audit committee appointments.

中文翻译：

---

自愿审计委员会和财务报告：韩国证据

这项研究调查了审计委员会任命程序中的法规变更是否以及如何影响公司对审计师或自愿审计委员会的选择。它还调查自愿审计委员会是否提高了收入质量。我们发现，所有权集中度较高的相对较大的中型公司成立了自愿审计委员会，以加强对大股东的控制，而这些审计委员会并没有改善财务报告。我们认为审计委员会不一定能改善财务报告的结果要求决策者和资本市场参与者更加重视审计委员会的任命。