In recent years an increasing number of analytic philosophers have become interested in the issue of the meaning of life (e.g., Cottingham 2003; Metz 2014; Wolf 2010; for an overview see Metz 2013). The majority of these philosophers have assumed that some lives are in fact meaningful. One among many conditions that have been claimed to be necessary and sometimes even sufficient for achieving meaning are certain affective mental states, such as emotions or feelings. Harry Frankfurt, for example, has argued that our lives are meaningful to the extent to which we care for or love things (1982a, b, 2004). And according to Susan Wolf, meaning requires both that we pursue objectively worthwhile projects and that we emotionally identify with or take pride in these projects (2010). In contrast to such non-nihilistic approaches, a number of contemporary analytic philosophers have also denied that meaning can be or at least actually is ever achieved at all (e.g., Martin 1993; Murphy 1982; Nagel 1986; Smith 2003). In the context of these views affective mental states have received far less attention. For example, nihilists have failed to investigate in detail which of these states (if any) promote recognizing the fact of life’s meaninglessness or which of these states result from this recognition. In advancing our understanding of these issues it therefore seems helpful to consider corresponding (typically more detailed and elaborated) debates in continental philosophy (e.g., Heidegger 1962; Sartre 1969, 2000). A particularly promising conception of nihilism’s affective dimension, and one that is particularly compatible with analytic approaches, has been provided by the French existentialist philosopher Albert Camus.

中文翻译：

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加缪的荒诞感

近年来，越来越多的分析哲学家对生命意义的问题产生了兴趣（例如，Cottingham 2003；Metz 2014；Wolf 2010；概览参见 Metz 2013）。这些哲学家中的大多数都假设有些生活实际上是有意义的。许多被认为是实现意义的必要条件之一，有时甚至是充分条件之一是某些情感心理状态，例如情绪或感觉。例如，哈里·法兰克福认为，就我们关心或热爱事物的程度而言，我们的生活才有意义 (1982a, b, 2004)。根据 Susan Wolf 的说法，意义既要求我们追求客观有价值的项目，又要求我们在情感上认同这些项目或为这些项目感到自豪 (2010)。与这种非虚无主义的方法相反，许多当代分析哲学家也否认意义可以或至少实际上曾经被实现（例如，Martin 1993；Murphy 1982；Nagel 1986；Smith 2003）。在这些观点的背景下，情感心理状态受到的关注要少得多。例如，虚无主义者未能详细调查这些状态中的哪些（如果有的话）促进了对生命无意义这一事实的认识，或者这些状态中的哪些是由这种认识引起的。因此，在推进我们对这些问题的理解时，考虑大陆哲学中相应的（通常更详细和详尽的）辩论似乎很有帮助（例如，海德格尔 1962 年；萨特 1969 年，2000 年）。虚无主义的情感维度的一个特别有希望的概念，并且与分析方法特别兼容，