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Against Hybrid Expressivist-Error Theory
The Journal of Value Inquiry ( IF 0.545 ) Pub Date : 2016-06-03 , DOI: 10.1007/s10790-016-9560-y
Wouter F. Kalf

Consider moral judgments like ‘stealing is morally wrong’ and ‘helping the poor is morally right.’ Cognitivists think that moral judgments express truth-apt beliefs. Cognitivist success theorists think that some moral judgments are true because the truth-makers they require exist. Cognitivist error theorists think that no moral judgment is true because the truth-makers they require do not exist. Non-cognitivists think that moral judgments express non-truth-apt non-cognitive states like desires or emotions. Quasi-realists are non-cognitivists who attempt to earn the right to speak about ethics as cognitivist success theorists do, which includes speaking about moral truth and moral objectivity, but without abandoning the claim that moral judgments express, at least in the first instance, non-truth-apt non-cognitive states.

中文翻译:

反对混合表现主义错误理论

考虑一下诸如“偷窃在道德上是错误的”和“帮助穷人在道德上是对的”等道德判断。认知主义者认为道德判断表达了符合真理的信念。认知主义成功理论家认为,某些道德判断是正确的,因为它们需要的真相制定者存在。认知错误理论家认为没有任何道德判断是正确的,因为他们需要的真理制定者不存在。非认知主义者认为道德判断表达了非真实的非认知状态,如欲望或情感。准现实主义者是非认知主义者,他们试图像认知主义成功理论家那样获得谈论伦理的权利,其中包括谈论道德真理和道德客观性,但不放弃道德判断所表达的主张,至少在第一时间,非真实的非认知状态。
更新日期:2016-06-03
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