C. D. Broad famously labelled the problem of providing our inductive practices with a proper justification “the scandal of philosophy” (Broad, 1952). Recently, John Norton has provided a dissolution of this problem (2014). According to Norton, inductive inference is grounded in particular facts obtaining within particular domains (J. Norton, 2003b, 2010, 2014). Because the material theory does not involve a universal schema of induction, Norton claims it dissolves the problem of induction (which implies that such universal schemas cannot be justified).

In this paper, I critically evaluate Norton's dissolution. In particular, I argue that the problem of induction is an epistemological problem, that Norton's material theory entails an externalist epistemology, and that it is a common feature of such epistemologies that they dissolve the problem of induction. The upshot is that the material theory is not unique in its ability to reap the specifically epistemic benefits of dissolving the problem of induction, and thus that the epistemic advantages of the material theory over extant alternatives in this regard are fewer than it may appear at first sight.

CD Broad 著名地将为我们的归纳实践提供适当理由的问题标记为“哲学的丑闻”（Broad，1952）。最近，John Norton 解决了这个问题（2014 年）。根据诺顿的说法，归纳推理基于在特定领域内获得的特定事实（J. Norton，2003b，2010，2014）。因为材料理论不涉及归纳的普遍模式，诺顿声称它解决了归纳问题（这意味着这种普遍模式不能被证明是正当的）。

在本文中，我批判性地评估了诺顿的解散。特别是，我认为归纳问题是一个认识论问题，诺顿的物质理论蕴含了一种外在主义认识论，而这种认识论的一个共同特征是它们解决了归纳问题。结果是，物质理论在获得解决归纳问题的特定认知益处的能力方面并不是独一无二的，因此在这方面，物质理论相对于现有替代方案的认知优势比最初看起来的要少视线。