In this paper, we present an explanatory objection to Norton's material theory of induction, as applied to predictive inferences. According to the objection we present, there is an explanatory disconnect between our beliefs about the future and the relevant future facts. We argue that if we recognize such a disconnect, we are no longer rationally entitled to our future beliefs.

中文翻译：

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揭穿材料感应

在本文中，我们对诺顿的材料归纳理论提出了解释性反对意见，该理论应用于预测推理。根据我们提出的反对意见，我们对未来的信念与相关的未来事实之间存在解释性脱节。我们争辩说，如果我们认识到这种脱节，我们就不再理性地享有我们未来的信念。