:In this essay, I distinguish two dimensions of responsibility: (i) responsibility for expressing the will (character, motives, and purposes) one has in action (voluntarily and without constraint) and (ii) responsibility for having the will one expresses in action. I argue that taking both of these dimensions into account is necessary to do full justice to our understanding of moral responsibility and our ordinary practices of holding persons responsible in moral and legal contexts. I further argue that the distinction between these dimensions of responsibility is importantly related to understanding age-old debates about the freedom of the will. For the first dimension of responsibility is historically related to the freedom of action—the power to freely express the will one already has in action. While the second dimension is historically related to the freedom of the will—the power to freely form or shape that will one may later express in action. And I argue that while the freedom of action so defined may be compatible with determinism, the freedom of will, and the deeper responsibility associated with it for forming one’s own will, which I call “ultimate responsibility,” are not compatible with a thoroughgoing determinism. In arguing throughout the essay for these claims and for the need to take into account both of these dimensions to do full justice to our understanding of moral responsibility, I consider ordinary practices of holding persons responsible in a variety of moral and legal contexts, discussing in the process H. L. A. Hart’s “fair opportunity to avoid wrongdoing” criterion for assessing responsibility and blame in legal and criminal contexts, the relevance of recent experimental studies about folk intuitions concerning assessments of responsibility and blame, Harry Frankfurt’s critique of the “principle of alternative possibilities,” the distinction between “will-settled” and “will-setting” actions, and contemporary critiques of the very possibility and intelligibility of an ultimate responsibility for forming one’s own will that would be incompatible with determinism.

中文翻译：

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责任维度：行动自由和意志自由

：在这篇文章中，我区分了责任的两个维度：（i）表达一个人在行动中的意志（性格、动机和目的）的责任（自愿和不受约束）和（ii）有一个人在行动中表达的意志的责任。行动。我认为，为了充分公正地理解我们对道德责任的理解以及我们在道德和法律背景下追究个人责任的常规做法，有必要考虑这两个方面。我进一步认为，这些责任维度之间的区别与理解关于意志自由的古老辩论很重要。因为责任的第一个维度在历史上与行动自由有关——自由表达行动中已经拥有的意志的权力。虽然第二个维度在历史上与意志的自由有关——自由形成或塑造意志的力量，后来人们可能会在行动中表达出来。我认为，虽然如此定义的行动自由可能与决定论相容，但意志自由以及与之相关的形成自己意志的更深层次的责任，我称之为“终极责任”，与彻底的决定论并不相容。 . 在整篇文章中争论这些主张以及考虑这两个方面以充分公正地理解我们对道德责任的理解时，我考虑了在各种道德和法律背景下追究个人责任的普通做法，在进程 HLA