:This essay offers a “nonideal” case for giving institutional priority to markets and private contracting in the basic structure of society. It sets out a “robust political economy” framework to examine how different political economic regime types cope with frictions generated by the epistemic limitations of decision-makers and problems of incentive incompatibility. Focusing on both efficiency arguments and distributive justice concerns the essay suggests that a constitutional structure that prioritizes consensual exchange is more likely to sustain a cooperative venture for mutual advantage.

中文翻译：

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稳健的政治经济和市场的优先性

: 本文提供了一个“非理想”案例，在社会基本结构中给予市场和私人契约制度优先权。它建立了一个“稳健的政治经济学”框架，以研究不同的政治经济体制类型如何应对决策者的认知限制和激励不相容问题所产生的摩擦。本文关注效率论点和分配正义问题，表明优先考虑自愿交换的宪法结构更有可能维持合作企业以实现互利共赢。