:In this essay I identify two burdens for eliminativist accounts of moral responsibility. I first examine an underappreciated logical gap between two features of eliminativism, the gap between descriptive skepticism and full-blown prescriptive eliminativism. Using Ishtiyaque Haji’s luck-based skepticism as an instructive example, I argue that in order to move successfully from descriptive skepticism to prescriptive eliminativism one must first provide a comparative defense of the conflicting principles that motivate the former. In other words, one must fix the skeptical spotlight. I then present and assess a second burden for eliminativists, they must meet what I call the motivational challenge. In order to meet this second burden, eliminativists must motivate their prescriptive account over preservationist competitors, and I assess two potential strategies for doing so. The first is to offer arguments that appeal to the gains and losses of abandoning our responsibility-related attitudes and practices, and the second is to offer direct arguments that we cannot retain these attitudes and practices. I conclude that the adequacy of either strategy remains at best an open question, but that making these burdens explicit might better position eliminativists to meet their competitors on more equal ground.

中文翻译：

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满足消除主义者的负担

: 在这篇文章中，我确定了道德责任的消除主义解释的两个负担。我首先检查了取消主义的两个特征之间的一个未被充分认识的逻辑差距，即描述性怀疑主义和成熟的规定性取消主义之间的差距。以 Ishtiyaque Haji 的基于运气的怀疑主义为例，我认为，为了成功地从描述性怀疑主义转向规定性取消主义，必须首先对激发前者的相互冲突的原则进行比较辩护。换句话说，必须解决怀疑的聚光灯。然后我提出并评估消除主义者的第二个负担，他们必须迎接我所说的激励挑战。为了满足这第二个负担，消除主义者必须激发他们对保护主义竞争对手的规定性说明，我评估了这样做的两种潜在策略。第一个是提供关于放弃我们与责任相关的态度和实践的得失的论据，第二个是提供我们不能保留这些态度和实践的直接论据。我的结论是，这两种策略的充分性充其量仍然是一个悬而未决的问题，但明确这些负担可能会更好地定位排除主义者，以便在更平等的基础上与他们的竞争对手会面。