:Most of the liberal moral and political debate concerning global poverty has focused on the duties of justice or assistance that the well-off have toward the needy. In this essay, I show how rights-based theories in particular have unanimously understood subsistence rights just (and only) as claims, where all it means to have a claim—following Hohfeld—is that others have a duty toward us. This narrow interpretation of subsistence rights has led to a glaring omission; namely, there has been no careful examination of what the rights-holders themselves may do to realize the object of their rights. Furthermore, in the few cases where this question gets posed, rights are again understood just (and only) as claims, but this time of an Austinian kind: rights-holders are limited to the performance of speech-acts like demanding, pleading, and entreating to make noncompliers fulfill their duties. I suggest that this approach betrays the original spirit of subsistence rights as individual moral powers delineating a sovereign sphere of action. More seriously, it is unjust to the rights-holders themselves, to the extent that many of the actions they undertake to realize the objects of their rights fall off the radar of moral analysis.

中文翻译：

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当生存权只是索赔而这是不公正的

: 大多数关于全球贫困的自由主义道德和政治辩论都集中在富人对有需要的人的正义或援助义务上。在这篇文章中，我将展示特别是基于权利的理论如何一致地将生存权理解为仅（并且仅）作为权利要求，在霍菲尔德之后，拥有权利要求的全部含义是其他人对我们负有责任。这种对生存权的狭隘解释导致了明显的遗漏。即，没有仔细审查权利人自己可以采取哪些措施来实现其权利客体。此外，在提出这个问题的少数情况下，权利再次被理解为（且仅）为主张，但这一次是奥斯汀式的：权利持有者仅限于诸如要求、恳求、并恳求使不遵守者履行职责。我认为这种方法背叛了生存权作为描绘主权行动范围的个人道德力量的原始精神。更严重的是，这对权利人本身是不公平的，以至于他们为实现其权利目标而采取的许多行动都没有被道德分析所关注。