:Reasons-responsiveness theories of moral responsibility are currently among the most popular. Here, I present the fallibility paradox, a novel challenge to these views. The paradox involves an agent who is performing a somewhat demanding psychological task across an extended sequence of trials and who is deeply committed to doing her very best at this task. Her action-issuing psychological processes are outstandingly reliable, so she meets the criterion of being reasons-responsive on every single trial. But she is human after all, so it is inevitable that she will make rare errors. The reasons-responsiveness view, it is claimed, is forced to reach a highly counterintuitive conclusion: she is morally responsible for these rare errors, even though making rare errors is something she is powerless to prevent. I review various replies that a reasons-responsiveness theorist might offer, arguing that none of these replies adequately addresses the challenge.

中文翻译：

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易错性悖论

: 道德责任的理性反应理论是目前最流行的理论之一。在这里，我提出了易错性悖论，对这些观点提出了新的挑战。这个悖论涉及一个代理人，她在一系列扩展的试验中执行一项有点苛刻的心理任务，并且她坚定地致力于在这项任务中做到最好。她发出行动的心理过程非常可靠，因此她符合对每一次试验都反应灵敏的标准。但她毕竟是人，难免会犯罕见的错误。据称，原因反应观点被迫得出一个非常违反直觉的结论：她对这些罕见的错误负有道德责任，即使犯下罕见的错误是她无力阻止的事情。