This article is an intervention in recent debates about conceptual and normative theorisations of human rights, which have been increasingly characterised by a divide between ‘moral’ and ‘practice-based’/’political’ understandings. My aim is to articulate an alternative, pragmatist understanding of human rights, one that is importantly distinct from the practice-based account with which it might be thought affiliated. In the first part of the article, I reveal the fundamental flaw in the practice-based account of human rights: I argue that it is undermined by the ontological thesis at its heart, which naturalises and reifies political arrangements and institutions that are radically contingent. In the second part, I identify, and outline the attractiveness of, a pragmatist normative account of human rights. In contrast to the practice-based approach, this pragmatist account construes human rights in ideational terms. The pragmatist understanding accepts both the contingency of our practices and the cultural limits to moral justification, while nevertheless retaining a commitment to the enterprise of normative philosophical conversation. I argue, in contrast to prevailing interpretations, that the international theory advanced by John Rawls exemplifies a pragmatist account of human rights and points a way forward for theoretically fruitful but appropriately circumscribed analysis of the concept.

中文翻译：

---

实用主义、实践和人权

本文是对最近关于人权概念和规范理论的辩论的干预，这些辩论越来越多地以“道德”和“基于实践”/“政治”理解之间的分歧为特征。我的目标是阐明对人权的另一种实用主义理解，它与可能被认为与之相关的以实践为基础的叙述截然不同。在文章的第一部分，我揭示了以实践为基础的人权解释的根本缺陷：我认为，它被核心的本体论论点所破坏，本体论论点自然化和具体化了极端偶然的政治安排和制度。在第二部分，我确定并概述了实用主义规范性人权说明的吸引力。与基于实践的方法相比，这种实用主义的解释是从概念性的角度来解释人权。实用主义的理解既接受我们实践的偶然性，也接受道德辩护的文化限制，同时仍保留对规范性哲学对话的承诺。我认为，与流行的解释相反，约翰·罗尔斯提出的国际理论体现了对人权的实用主义解释，并为理论上富有成果但适当限制的概念分析指明了前进的方向。同时仍然保持对规范性哲学对话的承诺。我认为，与流行的解释相反，约翰·罗尔斯提出的国际理论体现了对人权的实用主义解释，并为理论上富有成果但适当限制的概念分析指明了前进的方向。同时仍然保持对规范性哲学对话的承诺。我认为，与流行的解释相反，约翰·罗尔斯提出的国际理论体现了对人权的实用主义解释，并为理论上富有成果但适当限制的概念分析指明了前进的方向。