In this article, we propose a reconciliation between global equality of opportunity and self-determination, two central and seemingly conflicting principles in the contemporary theory of global justice. Our conception of reconciliation draws on the family-people analogy, following the account of familial relationship goods, developed by Harry Brighouse and Adam Swift, on permissible parental partiality and domestic equality of opportunity. We argue, first, that a plausible conception of global equality of opportunity must be able to distinguish morally arbitrary aspects of nationality that require mitigation from morally permissible ones. Second, we argue that a plausible criterion for the distinction integrates a person’s normative interests over a lifetime: (i) the interests of a child born into societal circumstances that impact her life prospects; and (ii) the interests of an adult citizen in collective self-determination. Third, we outline an account of ‘people relationship goods’, as a principled way to circumscribe the permissible scope of self-determination. Fair global equality of opportunity requires mitigating nationality-tracking inequalities, except those that fall within the permissible scope of collective self-determination.

中文翻译：

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给同胞读睡前故事：协调全球机会平等和自决

在本文中，我们提出了全球机会平等和自决之间的调和，这两个在当代全球正义理论中看似相互矛盾的核心原则。我们的和解概念借鉴了家庭与人的类比，遵循由哈里·布里格豪斯和亚当·斯威夫特发展的家庭关系商品，关于允许的父母偏爱和家庭机会平等。首先，我们认为，全球机会平等的合理概念必须能够区分道德上要求减轻的国籍的任意方面与道德上允许的方面。其次，我们认为一个看似合理的区分标准整合了一个人一生的规范利益：(i) 出生在影响其生活前景的社会环境中的孩子的利益；(ii) 成年公民在集体自决中的利益。第三，我们概述了“人际关系商品”的描述，作为限制自决允许范围的原则性方式。公平的全球机会平等要求减轻追踪国籍的不平等，但属于集体自决允许范围的不平等除外。