In “Principled Compromise and the Abortion Controversy” Simon C. May argues that we do not have a principled moral reason to compromise. While I seek to understand how more precisely we are to understand this suggestion, I also object to it: I argue that we have a principled moral reason to accept democratic decisions that we disagree with, and that this can only be so if disagreement can change what the all things considered right political position is. But if this is so, then also a principled moral reason to compromise is possible. I suggest that there is a class of procedures, including compromise, voting, expert delegation, and coin flip, such that when we disagree about what justice requires, we have a principled moral reason (though not necessarily a decisive reason) to engage in one of these procedures.

中文翻译：

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当我们不同意时，道德需要什么？

在“有原则的妥协和堕胎争议”中，Simon C. May 认为我们没有原则性的道德理由来妥协。虽然我试图了解我们如何更准确地理解这一建议，但我也反对它：我认为我们有一个原则性的道德理由来接受我们不同意的民主决定，并且只有当分歧可以改变时才会如此所谓正确的政治立场是什么。但如果是这样，那么妥协的原则性道德理由也是可能的。我建议有一类程序，包括妥协、投票、专家委派和抛硬币，这样当我们对正义的要求有分歧时，我们有一个有原则的道德理由（虽然不一定是决定性的理由）参与其中这些程序。