A philosophical account of self-knowledge should offer more than an epistemological explanation of first-personal privilege. It should also address the many cases where the first-person perspective is not so privileged, and account for the importance of self-knowledge to a person’s social and psychological well-being. Quassim Cassam’s Self-Knowledge for Humans and John Doris’s Talking to Our Selves both emphasize the importance of these latter tasks, but neither author is wholly successful: Cassam’s argument rests on a gross distortion of the “Rationalist” picture he sets up as a foil, and Doris’s on a skeptical argument that stands in some questionable company.

中文翻译：

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自我知识及其局限性

对自我知识的哲学解释应该提供的不仅仅是对第一人称特权的认识论解释。它还应该解决第一人称视角不那么具有特权的许多情况，并说明自我知识对一个人的社会和心理健康的重要性。卡西姆·卡萨姆的《人类的自我知识》和约翰·多丽丝的《与我们的自我对话》都强调了后面这些任务的重要性，但两位作者都没有完全成功：卡萨姆的论点建立在对他作为陪衬的“理性主义”图景的严重歪曲之上，和多丽丝的怀疑论点站在一些有问题的公司。