Given a traditional intuitionist moral epistemology, it is notoriously difficult for moral realists to explain the reliability of our moral beliefs. This has led some to go looking for an alternative to intuitionism. Perception is an obvious contender. I previously argued that this is a dead end, that all moral perception is dependent on a priori moral knowledge. This suggests that perceptualism merely moves the bump in the rug where the reliability challenge is concerned. Preston Werner responds that my account rests on an overly intellectualized model of perception. In this paper, I argue that though Werner may well be correct, my arguments, properly extended, still suggest that perceptualism leaves realists in no better position than intuitionism when it comes to the reliability challenge.

中文翻译：

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道德认知和可靠性挑战

鉴于传统的直觉主义道德认识论，道德现实主义者很难解释我们道德信念的可靠性。这导致一些人去寻找直觉主义的替代品。感知是一个明显的竞争者。我以前认为这是一个死胡同，所有的道德感知都依赖于先验的道德知识。这表明感知主义只是在可靠性挑战方面移动了地毯上的颠簸。Preston Werner 回应说，我的描述建立在一个过于智能的感知模型上。在这篇论文中，我认为虽然维尔纳可能是正确的，但我的论点，经过适当的扩展，仍然表明，在可靠性挑战方面，感性主义使现实主义者处于比直觉主义更好的位置。