Proponents of impure moral perception claim that, while there are perceptual moral experiences, these experiences epistemically depend on a priori moral knowledge. Proponents of pure moral perception claim that moral experiences can justify independently of substantive a priori moral knowledge. Some philosophers, most notably David Faraci (2015), have argued that the pure view is mistaken, since moral perception requires previous moral background knowledge, and such knowledge could not itself be perceptual. I defend pure moral perception against this objection. I consider two ways to understand the notion of “background knowledge” that is crucial to the objection. On a (stronger) reading, the claim that background knowledge is necessary for moral perception is likely false. On a second and weaker reading, the claim is true, but the background knowledge in question could be perceptual, and thus compatible with pure moral perception. Thus, the objection fails.

中文翻译：

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没有（先验）道德知识的道德知觉

不纯道德知觉的支持者声称，虽然存在感性的道德经验，但这些经验在认识上依赖于先验的道德知识。纯粹道德感知的支持者声称，道德经验可以独立于实质性的先验道德知识来证明其正当性。一些哲学家，最著名的是 David Faraci (2015)，认为纯粹的观点是错误的，因为道德感知需要先前的道德背景知识，而这种知识本身不可能是感性的。我捍卫纯粹的道德观念反对这一反对意见。我考虑了两种理解对反对意见至关重要的“背景知识”概念的方法。在（更强的）阅读中，关于道德感知需要背景知识的说法可能是错误的。在第二次和较弱的阅读中，这种说法是正确的，但所讨论的背景知识可能是感性的，因此与纯粹的道德感知相容。因此，反对无效。