Theories of public reason face a dilemma. If their standard of reasonableness is low, the view will be unacceptably anarchic and self-refuting, while if it is high, the exclusion of unreasonable views will manifest unequal treatment. This paper shows how to avoid this dilemma by distinguishing two models of public reason. The coercion model is vulnerable to the worry about anarchy but not self-defeat, while the reasons model is vulnerable to self-defeat but not anarchy. The coercion model can avoid anarchy without idealizing heavily via aggregation of individual policies into packages. The reasons model can avoid self-refutation by making acceptance of public reason one of the conditions for counting as fully reasonable, which is a natural constraint if the justification of the principle is relational.

中文翻译：

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公共理性的连贯性

公共理性理论面临两难境地。如果他们的合理性标准低，则其观点将是令人无法接受的无政府主义和自我反驳；如果高，则排斥不合理的观点则表现为不平等待遇。本文展示了如何通过区分公共理性的两种模型来避免这种困境。强制模型容易受到无政府状态的担忧而不是自取其辱，而原因模型容易受到自毁而不是无政府状态的担忧。强制模型可以通过将单个策略聚合到包中来避免无政府状态，而无需大量理想化。原因模型可以通过将接受公共理性作为完全合理的条件之一来避免自我反驳，如果原则的正当性是关系性的，这是一种自然约束。