According to our traditional conception of agency, most human beings are agents and most, if not all, nonhuman animals are not. However, recent developments in philosophy and psychology have made it clear that we need more than one conception of agency, since human and nonhuman animals are capable of thinking and acting in more than one kind of way. In this paper, I make a distinction between perceptual and propositional agency, and I argue that many nonhuman animals are perceptual agents and that many human beings are both kinds of agent. I then argue that, insofar as human and nonhuman animals exercise the same kind of agency, they have the same kind of moral status, and I explore some of the moral implications of this idea.

中文翻译：

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能动性和道德地位

根据我们传统的能动性概念，大多数人是代理人，大多数（如果不是全部）非人类动物不是。然而，哲学和心理学的最新发展表明，我们需要不止一种能动性的概念，因为人类和非人类动物能够以不止一种方式思考和行动。在这篇论文中，我区分了知觉和命题代理，我认为许多非人类动物都是知觉代理，而许多人类都是这两种代理。然后我认为，就人类和非人类动物行使相同类型的能动性而言，它们具有相同的道德地位，并且我探讨了这一想法的一些道德含义。